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To be honest, I was a bit dismayed when I first learned the title of Evan Thompson’s latest 
book. It was not because I had previously thought he was a Buddhist (I didn’t think this). 
And it was not because I believed that one should be a Buddhist in order to engage 
insightfully and rigorously with Buddhist philosophy (I don’t believe this). It was because 
the title, Why I am not a Buddhist, invites speculation about the reasons why, and it seemed 
to me that the most natural speculation is that he thinks there is something wrong with 
Buddhism, and that if one accepts his reasons for rejecting it, one would reject it also. Now, 
there is nothing wrong with arguing against Buddhism. But I work in a discipline that is 
already indifferent to it (at best). Academic philosophy is one of the least diverse and 
inclusive fields in all of the humanities. Its professional culture does not value Buddhism. 
Those who work in this field must continually make the case for its relevance to 
contemporary philosophical concerns. Evan is highly regarded in this community. His work 
on 4E (embodied, enactive, embedded, extended) cognition is ground-breaking and has 
deeply penetrated philosophy of mind and cognitive science. That his early writings relate 
this work to Buddhist philosophy has both promoted Buddhism as a worthy 
interdisciplinary partner and created new avenues of cross-cultural research. Evan’s 
scholarly engagement with Buddhism is also some of the clearest and best in the field. He’s 
one of my intellectual heroes and I’ve always considered him to be a great friend to Buddhist 
philosophy. For him now to be perceived as denouncing Buddhism and retreating from 
these earlier views creates a challenge for those following in his wake. It might appear that 
we’ve lost a champion, an influential one, and those already indifferent to Buddhism might 
take it as further reason not to engage with it at all. 
 Now, of course, this is not what Evan argues in Why I am not a Buddhist and is the very 
opposite of his intention. Evan repeatedly insists that he is, and wishes to be, “a good friend 
to Buddhism” (p.189). “[I]t’s unquestionably true,” he writes, “that Buddhism possesses a vast 
and sophisticated philosophical and contemplative literature on the mind” (37). He claims 
that “modern interpretations” of the Buddhist denial of self have “reinvigorated 
contemporary philosophical debates” and that this “confluence of cross-cultural philosophy 
and cognitive science has proved to be fertile for thinking about the self” (86). And he also 
defends a form of cosmopolitanism that includes Buddhist philosophy as a conversational 
partner worthy of respectful intellectual interest. But Evan ferociously denounces, what he 
calls, Buddhist modernism. The claims of Buddhist modernism, he argues, are biased (104), 
confused (18), dubious (22), specious (28), nonsensical (45) superficial (120), facile (88), and 
misguided (121). The arguments advanced in its support, Evan contends, are based on limited 
concepts (36), erroneous ideas (64), involve conflation (20), and turn on distinctions that are 
impossible to maintain (49). And he concludes that the core tenets of Buddhist modernism 
are philosophically and scientifically indefensible (188) and so are to be thoroughly rejected. 
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 Evan identifies Buddhist modernism as a view typical to Buddhist participants in the 
Mind and Life dialogues with the Dalai Lama initiated by Francisco Varela. He argues it is 
advanced by Goenka and presupposed by the Vipassana movement. And he locates it in the 
popular writings of several public intellectuals who promote Buddhism in relation to 
science. Buddhist modernism is no straw dummy. There is a genuine target for Evan’s 
critique. It is tempting to think, however, that academic cross-cultural Buddhist philosophy 
falls outside its purview. None of the ‘Cowherds’ are explicitly mentioned or targeted, for 
instance.1 Nor any well-regarded and philosophically trained Buddhist scholar.2 Moreover, 
according to Evan, a central tenet of Buddhist modernism is that Buddhism is superior to all 
other religions and, due to its unique rationalism and empiricism, counts as a science and 
not a religion. While some academic Buddhist philosophers do discuss its methodological 
features and do reconstruct and defend naturalised forms of Buddhist thought, you rarely 
find them doing so in the service of this comparative and scientistic position. And that they 
take truth as their evaluative standard for defending Buddhist claims is surely not a flaw. 
But academic Buddhist philosophy does not get off so lightly. Evan includes Thomas 
Metzinger and Miri Albahari in the class of Buddhist modernists. Metzinger and Albahari 
are university-based academic philosophers. Does Evan think they are isolated cases that 
just happen to share the views that he critiques? Or does he think they exemplify a broader 
problem with cross-cultural Buddhist philosophy in general? Who else counts as a Buddhist 
modernist beyond those mentioned in the book? What views, arguments and 
methodological approaches should we include under this heading and similarly dismiss, 
and which views does Evan think are genuinely worthy of respectful intellectual 
conversation? Evan clearly has a lot of time for historical Buddhist philosophy and its 
exposition. But does any positive engagement with Buddhism that seeks to interface with 
science survive this critique?  
 To answer these questions, we need to consider the arguments contained in the book. 
And, to some extent, that is what I will now do. But let me flag from the outset that my 
response is mixed. Evan is an extremely clear writer. His scholarship in philosophy of 
biology, cognitive science and Buddhist thought is exceptional. I agree with some of the 
expositions he provides in relation to these fields. Some of his arguments resonate with 
some of my own. And I agree with others that I hadn’t considered. But I also find that the 
rhetorical strength with which Evan articulates his views often suggests that he is arguing 
for much stronger and more restrictive positions than I think his reasons warrant. Indeed, I 
find that that many of his arguments admit of two interpretations; a moderate version with 
which I agree and a stronger version with which I do not. And these different versions of his 
argument have different implications for what counts as an appropriate way to engage with 
Buddhist philosophy, and thus for who is a target of critique. I will attempt to demonstrate 
this in what follows, and I will conclude by inviting Evan to clarify which version of his views 
he intends. I will start, however, by both articulating and endorsing what I take to be the 
 
1 The Cowherds is an international collective of Buddhist philosophers and scholars. It consists of Amber 
Carpenter, Georges Dreyfus, Bronwyn Finnigan, Jay L. Garfield, Charles Goodman, Stephen Jenkins, Guy 
Martin Newland, Graham Priest, Mark Siderits, Koji Tanaka, Sonam Thakchoe, Tom Tillemans, and Jan 
Westerhoff. 
2 Aside from Bob Scharf, whom he endorses. 
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central argument of the book and considering its positive upshot for contemporary Buddhist 
philosophy.  
 Evan rejects the Buddhist modernist claim that Buddhism is proven true by modern 
science. And he argues that the question ‘Is Buddhism true?’ is the wrong question to ask. 
One of the main clusters of reasons offered for this claim relates to the diversity of 
philosophical positions we find in the historical Buddhist tradition. This is also a theme of 
my own work. The question ‘Is Buddhism true?’ invites treating Buddhism as a systematic 
whole. But while all Buddhists sought to be consistent with the Buddha’s teaching, there 
was considerable debate about how they are to be interpreted, what they entail, and what 
texts should be accepted as authoritative. And these debates are reflected in distinct 
Buddhist traditions,  (Theravāda, Mahāyāna, Vajrayāna), distinct philosophical schools 
(Abhidharma, Yogācāra, Madhyamaka, Pramāṇavāda), as well as differences amongst thinkers 
within these traditions and schools. These debates are also shaped by the different cultures 
and intellectual traditions prevalent in the countries into which Buddhism was transmitted. 
There is thus no singular ‘Buddhist’ position on most debated issues by Buddhist 
philosophers; there are many Buddhist views on many substantive philosophical issues. It 
follows that one cannot answer the question ‘Is Buddhism true?’ without first clarifying 
which interpretation of Buddhism, and which philosophical analysis of it, one has in mind. 
The question ‘Is Buddhism true?’ is underdetermined. Evan is right, it is not the right 
question to ask. 
 Evan goes further. He argues that Buddhism, if taken as a whole, contains many radical 
ideas that are typically overlooked by those who argue that Buddhism is proven true by 
science. He focuses on the idea that liberated awareness (nirvāṇa) is unconditioned, non-
conceptual, and non-dual. Evan personally denies that such awareness is possible. He also 
insists that it does not fit easily with modern science. To argue that ‘Buddhism’ is true, 
however, requires engaging all of it, creating a narrative that justifies all Buddhist claims, 
including this idea of nirvāṇa. We might even wonder whether such a comprehensively 
justifying narrative is possible. Centuries of debate have resulted in a diversity of competing 
viewpoints. Buddhism, if taken as a whole, is thus inconsistent. How could Buddhism be 
both internally inconsistent and true? Evan additionally points out that those who claim 
that science proves Buddhism to be true often exclude karma and reincarnation, as if all else 
will remain the same. But, he argues, these ideas are so tightly integrated with important 
Buddhist ideas that their exclusion does not leave all else the same but requires 
constructively re-interpreting Buddhist thought.  
 What is the upshot of these arguments for contemporary Buddhist philosophy? It is 
certainly not that Buddhism is wrong and that questions of truth are misplaced. Rather, if 
one seeks to positively defend Buddhist thought in dialogue with science and other 
philosophical traditions, one should make clear which Buddhist position one is defending 
and be reflective and explicit about the extent to which one is reconstructing that position. 
But to clarify which Buddhist position one is defending requires first understanding that 
there is a diversity of interpretative options. And it seems that one reason Evan advises 
engaging with Buddhist philosophy is precisely to gain this perspective. He seems not to 
have a problem with positive reconstructions of Buddhist positions, or with innovating new 
forms of Buddhist thought and practice to solve new problems. But attempts to legitimise 
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one’s viewpoint as reflecting ‘the original teaching’ of the Buddha are firmly ruled out. “To 
be inspired by the early Buddhist texts and construct out of them a message for today is one 
thing; to try to legitimise one’s construction by claiming historical veracity for it is another” 
(20). The former is OK, the latter is not. 
 So far, I strongly agree. And since I take this to be the main argument of the book, I 
endorse its central message. But I have some reservations about some of the subsidiary 
arguments which appear to allow for two interpretations; a moderate version with which I 
agree and a stronger version with which I do not.  
 Throughout the book, Evan emphasises the importance of context for appreciating 
Buddhist thought. But it seems to me that there are two ways to understand his point. 
Moderately, it is the claim that recognising and understanding the philosophical and 
historical context of Buddhist ideas is important for understanding those ideas, particularly 
if those aspect of context are presupposed by Buddhist arguments. More strongly, however, 
it is the claim that Buddhist ideas do not make sense at all, they lose their meaning entirely, 
if extracted from their philosophical and historical context. These are not the same claim 
and have different implications for how one might legitimately engage with Buddhist 
thought. Consider the following two examples.  
 Evan calls naturalistic Buddhism the idea that Buddhism is consistent with scientific 
naturalism if one omits karma and reincarnation. He argues, however, that Buddhist 
theories of mind “lose their point” if one extracts them from this framework (11). This might 
be understood as the moderate claim that to understand (all, most, or some) Buddhist ideas 
about the mind, one needs to recognise that they are tightly integrated with ideas of karma 
and reincarnation and that to omit them requires some reconstruction. This sounds right. It 
could be read more strongly, however, as claiming that reconstructions of Buddhist views 
about the mind that do not also mention and integrate karma and reincarnation have no 
point and make no sense. But this seems unduly restrictive. There are different degrees with 
which Buddhist ideas about mind integrate with karma and reincarnation. Some are more 
tightly connected than others. Surely it is admissible to selectively focus on those that are a 
bit more distant (such as the possibility of reflexive awareness) and to put this idea into 
interdisciplinary dialogue without necessarily mentioning, emphasising, including the 
Buddhist commitment to karma and reincarnation.  
 Consider also Evan’s discussion of the importance of engaging with non-Buddhist Indian 
philosophical views for appreciating the Buddhist tradition. Evan seeks to refute the 
Buddhist modernist idea that the Buddhist position of no-self is superior to that of the 
Brahmanical traditions in classical India which hold that there is a self. And he does so by 
showing that classical Nyāya philosophers identified two important problems with the 
Abhidharma Buddhist reductionist analysis of no-self, and that these problems are still 
significant for contemporary cognitive science (105). The moderate upshot of this discussion 
is that Buddhism is not the only intellectual tradition with rigorous and important 
arguments relevant to science. “[T]he Brahmanical self theorists are no less rational and 
empirical than the Buddhist no-self theorists” (105). Further, if one seeks to defend the truth 
of Buddhism, it pays to engage and respond to the most pressing objections. And the 
Brahmanical traditions are important sources of targeted critique. So far, I strongly agree. 
But Evan draws a stronger moral; namely, that “we need a nonsectarian and cosmopolitan 
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philosophical perspective to appreciate the Buddhist intellectual tradition in general and its 
no-self theory in particular.” (105) He claims that “Buddhist philosophy must be seen in the 
dialectical context of its engagement with the other South Asian philosophical traditions” 
(105) and that “to privilege the Buddhist view in isolation from its dialectical 
interdependence with other traditions is to engage in Buddhist apologetics” (117). These 
remarks suggest that one cannot make sense of the Buddhist idea of no-self, let alone 
plausibly defend it, if one does not also consider objections raised against it by historical 
Brahmanical philosophers. But this is unwarranted. Certainly, if Buddhist arguments for 
no-self presuppose Brahmanical ideas then it follows one cannot properly appreciate them 
without considering those ideas. But just because Brahmanical philosophers had targeted 
objections does not mean that we cannot understand or appreciate the ideas they target 
independently. And it does not mean that there is something wrong with putting Buddhist 
claims into interdisciplinary dialogue with philosophy and science without, at the same time, 
engaging Brahmanical traditions or, indeed, all other worthy conversational partners that 
have a stake in the debate. Evan identifies Jonardon Ganeri as a paradigm of the approach 
he is championing. He writes “I find his cosmopolitan, pan-Indian perspective to be much 
more productive for cross-cultural philosophy than a strictly Buddhist view” (117). I am also 
inspired by Ganeri’s work. It is worth noting, however, that his most recent book restricts 
itself to reconstructing and defending Buddhagosa’s Theravāda Buddhist conception of 
mind in dialogue with philosophy of mind. And this strikes me as perfectly legitimate. While 
I strongly agree with the moderate upshot of Evan’s observations, I find the stronger 
versions unduly restrictive. 
  I have similar reservations to Evan’s critique of the attitude towards science assumed by 
naturalistic Buddhism. The question ‘Is Buddhism true?’ assumes a standard of assessment. 
And naturalistic Buddhists take this to be modern science. According to Evan, the view of 
science it assumes is a form of realism; that there is “a way the world essentially is in itself 
independent of any conceptual framework and that the mind can know this world.” (48). 
Evan claims to be both puzzled and frustrated by the attempt to make Buddhism fit science, 
so conceived. Puzzled, because he thinks it fails to recognise that the more radical Buddhist 
ideas undermine this realist assumption. And frustrated because he thinks it is a missed 
opportunity for “genuine encounter”, which he takes to involve distinct traditions 
challenging each other by focusing on their points of difference. He also seems to be a bit 
frustrated that the view of science assumed by naturalistic Buddhism is not the innovative 
4E version that he himself champions. 
 Now, there are some very reasonable points here. First, one should not uncritically 
assume the current state of modern science (or some image thereof) as one’s standard for 
assessing what counts as plausible or true. Modern science is neither monolithic nor 
complete. Its methods, assumptions, positions and arguments are not uncontested. There is 
much work to be done and much work being done. The possibility of science being radically 
transformed by an encounter with Buddhist philosophy is entirely missed if you simply 
exclude, from the outset, those elements that don’t fit with the current state of science. And 
if one also takes on board the earlier point about making explicit the Buddhist position one 
is defending, then one should also make sure that the commitments of that position are 
consistent with the image of science you are making it fit. Evan draws a parallel between his 
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4E approach to cognition and Madhyamaka Buddhism. The Dalai Lama is also a 
Madhyamaka Buddhist. But Madhyamaka is radically anti-foundationalist in its ontological 
commitments (at least on standard accounts). And so, a scientific naturalism which assumes 
ontological realism is not going to readily prove this form of Buddhism to be true, even if it 
is possible to omit karma and reincarnation from the story leaving all else the same.  
 Evan diagnoses the attempt to make Buddhism fit with scientific realism as a symptom 
of Buddhist modernism and thus poorly motivated. But this is too hasty. There is good 
reason to think, for instance, that Abhidharma Buddhist philosophers also  assumed that 
there is “a way the world essentially is in itself independent of any conceptual framework 
and that the mind can know this world.” (48) If this characterises the realism of scientific 
naturalism, then Abhidharma has this in common. Of course, you might argue, as Evan does, 
that Abhidharma is problematic and contains normative ideas that are not consistent with 
science. And you might also argue, as Evan does, that Madhyamaka Buddhism is preferable. 
But that Abhidharma Buddhism and scientific naturalism have this realist assumption in 
common is nevertheless a more plausible and charitable source of motivation to attribute 
the naturalistic Buddhist than simple appeal to authority grounded in a naïve conception of 
science. 
 This last issue, in closing, points to a broader theme in Evan’s critique of naturalistic 
Buddhism; namely, whether a “genuine encounter” between Buddhism and science must 
engage their radical points of difference, or whether interdisciplinary dialogue could still be 
productive if emphasising points of similarity (at least initially). Several remarks Evan 
makes in the book suggest he thinks the former. And I entirely take his point that encounters 
which emphasise radical points of difference have the greatest potential for transformation. 
But it strikes me, that there are other modes of interdisciplinary dialogue that are just as 
legitimate and also potentially fruitful. One might, for instance, put some aspect of Buddhist 
thought into dialogue with some existing scientific model and assess the degree of fit. If it is 
close, one might use this as grounds to explore what other related Buddhist ideas could add 
to this model or whether subtle differences on the periphery or in the background provide 
grounds for revision on either side of the dialectic. Or, if there are competing scientific 
models of some phenomenon, the fact that some Buddhist ideas seem to support one model 
rather than the other might lend some weight to contemporary discussions. Of course, this 
won’t be decisive. They might be similar or consistent but both false for all that. And one 
needs to remain mindful that scientific models are models and so whatever warrantability 
they might ascribe Buddhist views will depend on their theoretical virtues (rather than a 
proof of correspondence with mind-independent reality). The outcomes of these 
methodological approaches are also likely to be more modest than the radical 
transformation Evan envisions. But they nevertheless seem to be equally legitimate modes 
of interdisciplinary dialogue. And so, I conclude by inviting Evan to clarify which versions 
of his arguments he intends and to provide some additional justification if he had the 
stronger forms in mind. 
  
